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## I.—STAHL'S SYNTAX OF THE GREEK VERB.

### SECOND ARTICLE.

#### *Tenses.*

Stahl's treatment of the tenses begins with a definition of 'Zeitart' and 'Zeitstufe', variously rendered into English. 'Kind of time' answers fairly well for the one, 'sphere of time' for the other (S. C. G. 184). 'Aktionsart', as might be expected, does not suit Stahl's definition of the verb. 'Every verb', he says, 'does not involve action'. But it may be said that every verb involves manifestation, and there is no manifestation without some kind of motion, emanation, if you choose to call it so. Stahl's 'Erscheinung' does not escape the eternal flux. 'Dauernde Erscheinung'—the flux keeps up. 'Vollendete Erscheinung'—the flux is frozen. 'Erscheinung an u. für sich'—that is the flux wherever you strike it. These are the 'Erscheinungen' known as present stem, perfect stem, aorist stem. Under the head of reduplication Stahl calls attention to a fact which he considers of significance; to wit, that certain compound verbs use only the simple perfect. So, for instance, *τίθνηκα* serves as perfect to *ἀποθνήσκω*. There is nothing new in the theory that in a number of compound verbs the prepositions have lost their local sense wholly and serve merely to intensify. But that is largely a matter of personal sensitiveness and much yet remains to be done in this whole domain. The main thing here is that in the perfect Stahl sees nothing more than a certain strengthening of the meaning, a certain intensity which he recognizes as the original force of reduplication. The suffixes that go to form the present stem

may have had to do with the kind of time originally, but the primal force does not work uniformly and what we attribute to the suffix may belong to the root and, of course, under this head he pays his respects to the *-σκω* verbs, those inchoatives that Latin taught us to regard as inchoatives (Curtius G. V.<sup>1</sup> 284; A. J. P. XIV 258). The important thing, it seems, is to consider whether the verbal notion has to do with a 'condition' or an 'event' (A. J. P. XXIX 270). The present stem turns an 'event' into a 'condition', the aorist a 'condition' into an 'event'. As for the aorist, Stahl objects as others have done to 'punktuell' (A. J. P. XXIX 238) as characteristic of the aorist, inasmuch as the use of the aorist in *μάλα πολλὰ πλάγχθη* and *μυρί' ἄλγε' ἔθηκεν*, the use of the aorist with high numbers, excludes the conception of concentration in a point. The only possibility is the 'an und für sich' formula, which, be it said, has the great advantage of being as empty as the traditional aorist. 'Momentary' fails to satisfy him as it has failed to satisfy others (S. C. G. 243). Nor are we to consider 'perfective' as the original signification. The imperfect is quite as 'perfective' as the aorist. 'The kind of time of the aorist is a negative one', says Stahl. That being so, he might have added, the much maligned aorist is really more to the purpose, not to say to the point, than 'an und für sich'. 'The aorist', he continues, 'though an original tense, shows some historical development especially in the passive forms which, as we have seen, were originally intransitive (S. C. G. 137) and the perfect grows under our eyes'. The *-κα* form originally confined to the vowel stems as in Homer, Hesiod and Pindar spreads visibly to dentals, liquids and nasals; and the use of the perfect extends more and more until the height is reached in Isokrates and Demosthenes (no figures). Isokrates and Demosthenes, it might have been remarked, are orators, of whom perfects are to be expected (A. J. P. XXIII 248), for oratory stands nearer to practical life. The drama, it is true, is handicapped by the verse but, for all that, Aristophanes does not shun the perfect, and the resurrected Menander has it. Many verbs, indeed, form no active perfect. Stahl gives a list. He ought to have added, 'none that can be proved' (A. J. P. XXIII 249). Literary evidence must be supplemented by linguistic imagination.

Under the sphere of time—the 'Zeitstufe'—with its past, present and future, Stahl distinguishes between relative sphere of time and absolute sphere of time—the absolute sphere of time

being that of the speaker. This is not pernicious nonsense like the Hoffmann distinction (A. J. P. XXVII 109), but one does not admire everything that is harmless. How can that be absolute which is relative to the speaker? The augment being the sign of the past sphere of time, the unaugmented forms were left in charge of the other spheres of time, and among these forms the future. If the Greeks had not been such adventurous spirits they might, like so many others, have been content with the present indicative, but a seafaring people, who were always yearning to pass the pillars of Herakles, they were not satisfied with the conative present and pressed forward to an indicative future form—a form that is not indicative, beyond dispute (A. J. P. XXIX 267). Why an indicative future form at all? That the future was originally a mood, a fellow of the other future moods, subjunctive and optative, that it retains its modality in the participle throughout (A. J. P. XXVIII 352), that it has not ousted the other infinitives from futural expressions (S. C. G. 326), that it has not ousted the other moods from temporal sentences (A. J. P. XXIII 246)—all this seems to be self-evident, and I do not think it necessary to argue against the way in which Stahl has adjusted the facts to his range of vision, especially as he admits grudgingly that the origin of the future form in Greek is too obscure to allow any certainty about it, so that he may be wrong—and he is wrong, as it seems to me, hopelessly so.

‘The future, both active and middle’, continues Stahl, ‘is a manner of present future and has nothing to do with the kind of time.’ The future perfect, it is true, brought with it the kind of time but it has a small range, though one does not see what the smallness of the range has to do with it, if the phenomenon itself is distinctive; but the latest development, by far the latest, the future passive, as distinguished from the form common to middle and passive, develops on the basis of the aorist and Stahl maintains that as there is no contrasting durative form, it is indifferent as to the kind of time. From this it appears that Stahl recalcitrates against the theory urged by Voemel long ago and maintained by Blass that when two passive futures are formed, the older form is durative, the younger aoristic (S. C. G. 168)—a theory which B. maintained so doggedly that he would not accept the slightest suspension of the rule. See his review of my S. C. G. in L. C. B. 1901, p. 897. Compare also A. J. P. XXIII 237, where I have suggested the aoristic ply of the fut. ind. as

a whole and the remarkable steadiness of the aor. part. with *φθίσομαι*. But Stahl maintains stoutly that no such distinction can be proved and such is his attitude towards *ἔξειν* and *σχήσειν* also, which I did not think fit to put in the same line with the passive future because of the oratorical usage. See A. J. P. XXII 228; XXVI 239. It is interesting to note that Wackernagel has also declared against the acceptance of the distinction. See IGF. XXII (1908), Anzeiger, S. 66. According to Stahl, the present sense of the present indicative is developed from the inherent durative sense; and the specialization of that sense is due to the absence of the augment and the presence of the futural form. But the present sense is just as conspicuous in languages that have no augment and the 'durative' sense comes from the prevalence of the long forms. A typical difference having set itself up between imperfect and aorist in certain forms, the present associates itself with the imperfect and becomes by preference durative, by preference progressive. Such, at least, seems to me a more reasonable explanation, for the present is both durative and aoristic. The universal present is aoristic, true at any point, and the aorist despite its augment is used for 'punctuate' action in the present (S. C. G. 260; cf. A. J. P. XXIII 245). It is unnecessary to go through the familiar categories of the specific present, the universal present, the present of unity of time, the *πάλαι*-group, the *praesens de conatu*, corresponding to *-turus sum*. See Ar., Th. 918: *κωλύεις*, where Cobet writes *κωλύσεις* unnecessarily. For Pindaric examples see I. E. cii. Then comes the present for perfect (perfektivisches Praesens), familiar enough in verbs that involve unity of character (S. C. G. 204), a category, which, as it seems to me, Stahl extends unduly. So I cannot feel with Stahl and others, Pind., O. 5, 23: *νιῶν παρισταμένων* as *νιῶν παρεστώτων*. Motion is not excluded. *ἴστασθαι* has not the stock-stillness of *ἑστάναι*. One can press forward, one can shift one's feet. Compare Plat., Euthyd. 274 B: *οἱ δὲ ἐτύγχανον ἡμᾶς ἤδη περιεστώμενοι*, 'clustering round us', with C: *οἱ ἄλλοι ἐκείνον ἰδόντες περιέστησαν ἡμᾶς*. In verbs of privation, which Stahl masses with the others, *στέρομαι* is not quite the same as *ἐστέρημαι*. Verbs of privation connote feeling (Pindar, P. 6, 22).

The historical present Stahl calls preterital, psychological, rhetorical; and he finds no difficulty where Brugmann has found increasing difficulty. 'Anybody can see that the rhetorical emphasis of it unfits it for the equable flow of the epic narrative', and

if Stahl had known of my treatment of the subject, he would doubtless have seconded my statement that it was tabooed as vulgar by the epos and the higher lyric (A. J. P. XXIII 245). It is said that the historical present does not occur in the Nibelungenlied and a frivolous novelist of our day asks the question which Punch also asks, 'Why do women always write in the present tense? Is it because they have no past?' I have had to fight for the exclusion of the historical present from Pindar, so that I am not impressed by one of Stahl's rare references, 'Vgl. Christ.' As for Bakchylides compare A. J. P. XXVII 482. That the historical present is used by preference for the turning points of a narrative is another old story. Of the annalistic present he takes no notice (S. C. G. 200). In poetry he makes allowance for the pressure of the metre and the love of variety, and under the head of the present for the future he examines a number of passages in which in his judgment the present has been wrongly taken by the commentators as a future. <With the elaborate apparatus at the command of the Greek for the designation of future time, it is not strange that the folkspeech present for the future should have gone out of use, just as in English the present for the future has been crowded out of the principal sentence by *will* and *shall*, whereas it has all its rights in the subordinate sentence, so much so that Dr. Abbott declines to recognize 'if I shall—' as genuine English (A. J. P. XXVII 332)>.

Next comes the prophetic present and the γίγνεσθαι verbs, γίγνομαι being = ἔσομαι, better I should say = μέλλω ἔσεσθαι. ἔσομαι, he might have added but could not be expected to add, leans to the durative as γενήσομαι to the aoristic. In the critical discussion of various passages, the notorious ἐρημοῦτε of Th. III 58, 5 comes up, where Stahl reads ἐρημοῦντες. Stahl's emendations often remind me of Albert Wolff's famous criticism of a performance of Victor Hugo's *Le roi s'amuse*. Il était tout seul.

The imperfect—ὁ παρατατικός—is divided by Stahl into two classes—the absolute and the relative—a futile division, as I have intimated before; and absolute duration, into uninterrupted and interrupted, or, as it is called by others, intermittent action. But as every phenomenon has some duration, 'it is perfectly possible', he says, 'to represent a momentary action as a durative action'—a liberty, to which, it seems, Homer is much given,—and a durative action as a momentary one—a deplorable way of putting it from my point of view (S. C. G. 205). Duration is purely subjective.

'Longum' means 'tedious'. 'Il a des longueurs' as the French critic said of his friend's distich. The descriptive imperfect is divided by Stahl into 'das Imperfektum der Beschreibungen u. das Imperfektum der Schilderungen'. We too can distinguish between 'describing' and 'picturing', but I question the value of all this synonym-mongering. The multiplication of categories, which I have elsewhere compared to the manufacture of spectrum gratings may be a highly scientific process, must be a highly scientific process or else so many reputations would not have been made by it, but a joy it is not except to the multiplier, who 'counts the heads of his beloved ones' and proceeds to widen the circle of his family: and this brings us to Stahl's Imperfect of Propagation (des Fortwirkens), which is found in verbs that involve a reagent. In the first class the action is continued until the reaction sets in—a large class which is composed of verbs that fall into the category of Will and Endeavor, verbs of Entreaty and Command, Persuasion and Advice, Compelling and Confiding, Sending and Calling. Under this head we find registered the notorious *ἔπεμπον*, 'escorted' rather than 'sent' (S. C. G. 212) and the notorious *ἔλειπον*, which I have called the Imperfect of Reluctance (A. J. P. XXIII 250). 'This class of imperfects', says Stahl, 'is especially common when there is no response, when the endeavor is vain, when we have successful resistance to pressure.' The second class has reference to a subsequent citation or a subsequent exertion. The former provides for verbs of saying, the latter provides for preliminary action, to be followed by aoristic action. But no sooner have we settled down to this distinction than we are informed that after all the author is free to look at things as he chooses, and this vindication of the rights of the 'Anschauungsweise' recurs with wearisome iteration. At the same time it cannot be denied that this elaborate treatment may be of service to those who believe in aoristic imperfects, made up chiefly of verbs of saying (A. J. P. XXIV 180), which have a natural leaning to the imperfect (Kühner-Gerth II 1, 144). 'As I was saying' 'cum diceret', 'il disait'. 'So sagte sie, ich hör' sie ewig sprechen' is the clue. The familiar category of the *imperfectum de conatu* is unfolded at great length, and paralleled with the Latin periphrastic future—*ἐστέλλετο* = *profecturus erat*. Why the Latin only and not the Greek *ἐμέλλον* also? (S. C. G. 272). The negative of the imperfect *de conatu*, is what I have called 'resistance to pressure'. Earle's 'frustrated effort' (A. J. P. XXII

227) is in my judgment no improvement on the phrase. 'Frustrated' connotes finality. Other categories recognized by Stahl are the imperfect of incomplete action, the 'perfective imperfect'—a most unhappy bit of nomenclature—of completed phenomena that hold their own in the past, both sparingly represented by examples, and the imperfect as the preterite of perfective and praeterital presents, as in *ἔτικτε, ἐνίκα, ἠδίκουν*. That he does not put *ἐποίει* and *ἔγραφε* in the same class shows the arbitrariness of the whole thing.

Under relative duration Stahl takes up contemporaneous and overlapping 'phenomena'. These are, of course, especially important in connexion with compound sentences; and the overlapping category has been too much neglected both in Greek and Latin, as I pointed out forty years ago. Among the imperfects of relative duration Stahl puts the so-called Philosophic Imperfect (S. C. G. 210) and what I have called in jest the Expergefacient Imperfect (S. C. G. 219)—the waking up to a state of things—a phenomenon common to a large range of languages, Spanish, as I have noticed, being conspicuous among them. Whatever may be thought of this perpetual categorizing, the large collection of examples is to be welcomed. Nothing, it is true, will serve as a substitute for the study of the tenses *in situ*, but there is a kind of parallel bars gymnastic that may help the beginner to a proper conception of the imperfect—no easy thing after all (A. J. P. XXIII 292). Finally, Stahl has something to say about the overlapping imperfect and the imperfect of a previous past (Vorvergangenheit) and then we are allowed to take up the perfect.

The perfect is a present perfect. The phenomenon is completed in the present. The present sense, it seems, comes from the absence of the augment and from the fact that a completed phenomenon cannot complete itself in the future, <and yet some augmentless languages have highly effective present perfects and imagination can transport the perfect into the future (S. C. G. 234), as Stahl does not fail to tell us>. There is an intensive perfect (S. C. G. 229) and what Stahl chooses to call an extensive perfect, a perfect extending between two points (S. C. G. 227). The intensive perfect is confined to a few words and the assignment to the category is not always certain (S. C. G. 231). The bulk of the uses falls under the extensive perfect which, as I have said, looks at both ends of an action or as Stahl expresses it, 'a con-



dition that has been evolved from a past phenomenon'. The German translation is not 'ist geworden' but 'ist'. γέγραπται = 'es ist geschrieben', 'es steht geschrieben' as in English 'stands written', τέθανται 'lies buried'. Everybody knows the trouble in English and the late evolution of a passive tense of continuance in order to prevent ambiguity and how 'is being' holds its own despite the conservatives (A. J. P. XXIII 125). 'The post-Homeric use of the perfect', says Stahl, 'agrees essentially with the Homeric use', and he takes no notice of Wackernagel's studies. Only, as a matter of course, the employment of the perfect active spread with the spread of the formation and besides that, we notice a gradual increase especially in the range of prose (cf. S. C. G. 248). Here again it becomes necessary to insist on the sphere. The nearness of any department of literature to practical life may readily be measured by the perfect. The perfect belongs to the drama, to the orators, to the dialogues of Plato. In history the perfect has no place outside of the speeches and the reflective passages in which the author has his say; and when we read in Stahl that the perfect is much more common in Xenophon than in Herodotos and Thukydides, we remember that the authorship of Xenophon is not wholly historical and that he affects *naïveté* (A. J. P. XXIX 244). Plato, we are told, holds the mean. Of the orators, Isokrates and Demosthenes are in the van, quite comprehensible, if true. Isokrates measures everything by the present, which is honoured by his existence, and Demosthenes is a practical soul. But I find that I am repeating myself. See above, p. 390. Well, if I were not repeating myself, I should fail to reproduce the repetitious character of my author.

This perfect or rather present perfect is divided and subdivided by Stahl in a wearisome way that reminds one of those who make a category of every possible translation of the moods and tenses (A. J. P. XIX 351), and there are unlimited possibilities of dispute. Take, f. i., μέμνηε. Stahl considers it an instance of the past in its present effect. ὁ δ' ἔχων μέμνηεν. 'He is beside himself', the result of ἐμάνη. Why not 'he is stark mad', as an emotional perfect like δέδια? And then after all we come back to the 'Anschauungsweise', and 'the open sense of the student is the only open sesame' (A. J. P. XXIII 252). But for one I should never go so far as to say that P. I, 13 πεφίληκε = φιλω. If νερόμικε Plat., Soph. 217 B, which Stahl cites, corresponds to ἡγείται, it is because the settled acceptance of the perfect of νομίζω brings it

nearer to the deliberate judgment of ἡγείται. πεφόβηται is not φοβοῦμαι nor ἀπεστυγήκασι ἀποστυγούσι. They are verbs of emotion and the difference from the present is actually translatable, though that is a test on which we must never insist. The perfect for the future perfect Stahl calls the perfect of anticipation and distinguishes between present and future occurrence, both being immediate and certain, a sense that is imported into the form (S. C. G. 281). The perfect of anticipation is not Homeric, though Od. 20, 351-357 we have a perfect of vision, parallel with the prophetic present. With this perfect of anticipation, Stahl parallels the present of anticipation in order to prove that the present is not of itself a future. The empiric perfect he excludes from Homer. There is no conceivable theoretical reason for this and the Homeric examples I have given (S. C. G. 257) of the gnomic use of the perfect based on experience (= empiric perfect) still seem to be perfectly cogent.

Like the perfect the pluperfect is divided by Stahl into intensive and extensive. The extensive pluperfect is a blend of past and praeterpast (Vorvergangenheit), this 'Vorvergangenheit' being the point most stoutly denied by Delbrück, Brugmann and others and set down as differentiating Latin and Greek pluperfect. 'Herodotos', says Stahl, 'has a certain preference for the tense' (compare A. J. P. XXIII 250; S. C. G. 264) and the increase of its use coincides with the increase in the use of the perfect (no figures). Next we have the pluperfect of the past state, of preceding result, 'which differs from the aorist only in the way one looks at it', the pluperfect of that which is 'over and gone', the pluperfect of 'rapid relative completion', and yet other subdivisions which are all illustrated with irritating departures from chronological sequence; e. g., Od., Xen., Il., Plato, Xen., Plato.

Everybody tries his hand on a new way of defining the aorist. I have tried several myself. 'Apobatic' seems to me better than 'aoristic'. The tense of culmination is not altogether bad. 'Consummation' which has been suggested associates itself too readily with the perfect—'consummatum est', τετέλεσται. Stahl, as we have seen, says that the aorist designates past time 'an und für sich'. But the English language rebels against 'an u. für sich', that famous German improvement on the old αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτό, the old *per se*. After all, the traditional designation 'aorist' answers as well as anything else. It has become a technical term and Stahl has to admit that Apollonios understood the aorist indica-

tive perfectly, though his mind was not clarified as to the 'kind of time'. Fifty years ago whose was? And yet Apollonios was capable of making a sharp distinction between present and aorist imperative (compare A. J. P. XXIII 241). Now, according to Stahl, the notion of duration having long been connected with the imperfect and pluperfect, the only thing left to denote the 'momentary phenomenon' was the aorist and so the aorist became the tense of momentary action, as a manner of residuary legatee. But this notion of momentary action has done no end of harm, to which Stahl himself has furnished the antidote by adding that the momentary tense may be used when the notion of duration is of no moment.

In Stahl's representation the aorist is the narrative tense by eminence, a statement that seems to require some modifications in the light of statistics (A. J. P. XXIX 243). "Of course", says Stahl, as he had said before, "an imperfect can be used of a rapid action because all 'phenomena' occupy some time". Still that does not exclude the expression of a greater or less stretch of time by the contrasted use of imperfect and aorist; as, Il. 23, 228: *πυρκαϊὴ ἐμαραίνετο, πάσατο δὲ φλόξ*; and yet there are passages in which we find a shift from one tense to the other without any observable difference in actual duration. But for all that Stahl is as unwilling as I am (S. C. G. 212; A. J. P. XXIII 243) to concede an actual interchange of tenses. The artist's *ἐποίησε* he explains by the creative act, *ἐποίει* by the duration of the artist's labour—an explanation which does not explain (compare S. C. G. 212 note; A. J. P. XXIII 251). Then comes the perfective aorist of which he makes two classes; one that sums up a previous statement, one that gives the historical result. This perfective aorist is the 'upshot aorist' of S. C. G. 238. Stahl objects to 'complexive' in which others have found comfort and will have naught to do with 'punktuell', which he dismisses curtly by reference to Stesich. 11; Eur., Hec. 683; Hdt. 1, 35. I do not feel the cogency. Much space is naturally given to the empirical aorist, for which gnomic aorist is to Stahl only another name. A detailed criticism of Stahl's presentation of this much discussed section of the aorist would require a special treatise. The essential points are anticipated in my syntax. This empiric aorist occurs frequently in Homer but chiefly in comparisons, and it is relatively more common in poetry than in prose. Gorgias abuses it in his *Helena* and I may add that Isokrates is not averse to it. The rare aorist

of an action that failed of accomplishment, in which the will appears as a deed, has a special chapter. It is necessarily short. The examples so far as they are cogent are all from the Ion of Euripides. No one will question the closeness of the meshes of Stahl's dragnet. I pass over the anticipatory aorist, the aoristic question in *τί οὐ*; the dramatic aorist.

Against the term 'ingressive' aorist Stahl protests as he generally protests against everything that he does not originate. 'Zwischen *ἡβάσκειν* und *ἡβῆσαι* ist in Bezug auf das Stadium der bezeichneten Erscheinungen gar kein Unterschied, wenn man nicht einen solchen hineintüfteln will. Warum soll man nun das eine inchoativ und das andere ingressiv nennen?' The protest is rather amusing in view of the author's own 'Hineintüfteleien'. But the distinction between 'inchoative' and 'ingressive' is no 'Hineintüftelei'. Our English 'begin' is ambiguous. Sometimes it is antithetic to the end of an action. 'It began to rain' ('It ceased to rain'. Sometimes it refers to the entrance upon a state. 'He began to reign'. One is imperfect, inchoative, one is aoristic, ingressive. Under this head I would add that in view of S. C. G. 239, it is interesting to observe that all the typical examples cited by Stahl except *ἔσχον* (S. C. G. 241) are first aorists, a point to which Stahl does not call attention any more than he calls attention to the affinity of the aorist for the negative (S. C. G. 245) or to the use of the aorist with definite numbers (S. C. G. 243), both of which categories would have saved special attitudinizing in the matter of 'Anschauung'.

The future is indifferent as to the kind of time (S. C. G. 265), indifferent also as to the sphere inasmuch as it can be employed as a *futurum exactum* which the Greek lacks (cf. A. J. P. XXIII 147). The future of the future ascertainment of a present action is not specifically Greek and the category is of more importance when we have to do with the temporal relations of the optative + *ἄν*. Still it was well worth registering as was also the future of verbs of will. Compare Jebb on Soph., O. T. 1077. My note on Pindar, O. 7, 20 is *ἐθελήσω διορθῶσαι* = *ἐθέλων διορθώσω*. Stahl says that the will does not exert itself until the occasion arises or rather: wenn der Wille sich an ein vorhergehendes in der Zukunft Liegendes anschliesst, also mit diesem erst in Wirksamkeit tritt. With all my admiration for the German language, the study of Stahl's syntax has heightened my thankfulness that I was born to an idiom that does not lend itself readily to such roundaboutness, that my native tongue is one that has been styled 'the

pemmican of language'. The treatment of the future perfect follows the usual lines.

The periphrastic tenses, to which I have paid especial attention in my Syntax, Stahl divides into (1) the *in eo esse ut* class into which he puts the notorious Thukydidean μεταπεμπόμενοι ἦσαν (3, 2, 2) 'which they were on the point of importing', whereas my translation would be 'of which they were (had been) regular importers'; (2) the class in which the notion of reality lying in the so-called copula is emphasized (cf. S. C. G. 247); (3) in which the participle assumes an adjective sense (S. C. G. 291; cf. 191); (4) as a mere periphrasis, σχῆμα Χαλκιδικόν. I do not care to discuss the coincidences and differences of treatment. I will only say that Pind., N. 10, 18: παρὰ ματέρι βαίνοισ' ἔστι is not the same as π. μ. βαίνει. It is = μητρὶ παραβάτις ἐστί. It is parallel with O. 2, 84: ὃν πατήρ ἔχει πάρεδρον. In one court we have an assessor, in the other an attendant (lady in waiting). The elevation of the periphrasis with γίγνομαι is recognized but not the source of it (S. C. G. 141). Under ἔχω with the participle Stahl does not commit himself to the doctrine which some consider the only sound one, ἔχω = εἰμί (A. J. P. XVIII 356). 'μέλλω', he notes, 'is sometimes a mere periphrasis and so is ἐθέλω'. This ought to have made him more tolerant of the original modal character of the future, which was afterwards more or less effaced.

The subject of the tenses of the moods is treated with characteristic prolixity. We are told over and over again that we have to deal with the kind of time and not the sphere of time, over and over again that, after all, the difference is the difference of the point of view, so that we become positively ungrateful to the tireless scholar who has heaped up example after example of constructions that no one will dispute. There is just enough historical sequence in some sections to fret the orderly soul at the confusion in others. Here a wall, there loose blocks of quarried stone. In the section where he shows that the *de conatu* use of the participle is especially common, there is a fair approach to something that might be called arrangement, Od., Pind., Aeschyl., Soph., Eur., Herod., Th., Plato, Isae., Dem. It is a rich section and I should have been glad to draw on it, when I was giving one of my critics an elementary lesson in Greek syntax (A. J. P. XXVIII 111, 352). To be sure, Stahl does not exercise his critical faculty on P. 4, 106, where some would read unnecessarily κομίξων (Pindar, I. E. cii) nor on Eur., Phoen. 81 where Valckenaer

read *λύσουσ'* against which my syntax entered a silent protest (S. C. G. 193; A. J. P. XXVIII 352), for I deliberately preferred to make a selection among my examples and sacrificed opulence to order. Not that my original collections could compare with the sweepings that Stahl has stowed away in his vast granary, but a universal usage loses its interest for one who is on the search for stylistic differences. See S. C. G., p. 138, footnote. And so Stahl goes on to show that all his categories of the kind of time reappear in the 'side moods'. The present imperative inf. is used in Attic decrees for durative or repeated action, the aorist for a special case. See Meisterhans, one of Stahl's few references. But Meisterhans will bear watching. If the mechanical regularity of Attic inscriptions is as great as M. makes it out to be, it presents an interesting point of contrast to the Attic orators, who are much freer in their ways and this is a subject which may possibly reward exploration. 'The Gortyn IS. is reckless in the matter of the kind of time', says Stahl. 'But the Gortyn IS. has troubled the syntactical Israel before (A. J. P. XVI 388). The perfect of the side moods is true to the kind of time, completion, intensity, overwhelming finality. The aorist of the side moods indicates a momentary 'phenomenon', but it can also be used of the durative, as we have seen, when momentariness is not momentous. For the frequent use of the aorist opt. in universal sentences (good at any point), S. cites Soph., Antig. 652 a negative sentence (S. C. G. 246) and Eur., Ion 380 where a definite number is given (S. C. G. 243). In the list of 'inchoative' aorists of the moods the only second aorist examples are *κάμῃ* (Hdt. 3, 99, where *ὅς ἂν κάμῃ* = *νοσήσῃ*), *σχές*, *σχέιν* (*κατασχέιν*), *φανῆναι*, *στῆναι*, but neither here nor in the corresponding section has Stahl called attention to this not unimportant predominance of the first aorist. As the empiric aor. and perfect get their meaning from the sphere of time, the side moods share in the signification only so far as they represent the indicative—not so self-evident after all. And then we have the inevitable chapter on the 'Freiheit der Anschauung', which reminds one of the recurrent Euripidean tag, *πολλαὶ μορφαὶ τῶν δαιμονίων*. *γνώθι σαυτόν* is every whit as good as *γίγνωσκε σαυτόν*. You may translate the difference, as I have done (S. C. G. 302), but the difference does not amount to anything, and Stahl is quite right, as no one follows the advice, least of all, syntacticians. Of course, with this freedom of choice the poets are tempted to shift from aorist to present and present to aorist at the piping of the metre,

but Stahl forbears to dwell on that perilous point (A. J. P. XXIX 376), as well he may. Under this head of the shift from one tense to another Stahl gives an interesting series of examples, some of which he explains, while others are consigned to the 'Anschauung' washpot. Isocr. 3, 35 we have the negatived aor. followed by the positive perfect, an example cited together with others, S. C. G. 250.

Next we are assured with unnecessary prolixity that in simple sentences tenses of the subj. and imper. have only to do with the kind of time, *μαχώμεθα, ἐξέλθωμεν, πείθεσθε, μὴ δέισητε*, the sphere of time being necessarily future. The subj. after verbs of fear is only a seeming exception. <In both the classic languages, be it remarked, the failure to recognize the difference between the action itself and the ascertainment of the action has given grammarians much trouble. See LG<sup>3</sup> 257, 2, S. C. G. 435 and compare Gellius XVIII 2, 14.> So Od. 15, 13: *μή τοι κατὰ πάντα φάγωσιν . . . σὺ δὲ τηῦσίην ὁδὸν ἔλθης, φάγωσιν* refers to the future of the action, *ἔλθης* to the future of the ascertainment = *ἐλθὼν φανῆς* (S. C. G. 294).

Whilst the will has to do with the future, the opt. according to Stahl as the mood of the wish is not bound by the sphere of time. It may deal with the past, present or future, but the Greek does not live up to its privileges; and whereas the Latin aor. opt. is freely used of the past, there are only a few Greek aor. optatives that can be so construed and Stahl declares that he has corralled them all. They are a sorry lot. Od. 13, 229: *ἀντιβολήσῃς* is an imperative opt. Od. 18, 79: *μήτ' εἷης μήτε γένοιο* in the mouth of high-tempered Antinoos reminds one of Sir Anthony Absolute's threat, 'I'll disown you, I'll disinherit you, I'll *unget* you'. Antinoos simply wishes Iros ungot. *εἶναι* and *γενέσθαι* are combined to make up a totality, 'cease to be, be utterly extinct'. Aesch., Ag. 670: *γένειτο δ' ὥς ἄριστα* is a wish for ascertainment. Four of the passages are from Euripides, who often forces the note. Andr. 766: *ἢ μὴ γενοίμαν* might be called a general wish. The personal *ἐγώ* is really an impersonal *τις* and the sentiment is *τὸ μὴ γενέσθαι—κρείσσον*. The three other passages, Hel. 215, Hipp. 406, Rh. 720, have all *ἄλοιτο*, a sweeping imprecation, which it is not necessary to analyze in Greek any more than one analyzes 'damn' in English. We are perfectly free in damning a man after he is damned already. Here is where the literary sense comes in. We are not to confound poetic freedom with linguistic survival. When Job cursed his day, he might have cursed it in the optative and in 'Woe worth the day that cost thy

life, my gallant gray', 'Woe worth' might be rendered by *ῥαίτο*. As for Plat., Phaedr. 227 C: *εἴθε γράψειεν*, there is no earthly need of making *γράφειεν* refer to the past. That the optative may have had this use in prehistoric times is possible but the survival is unlikely. The case is parallel with that of the Lat. present subj., where we expect the imperfect. Why may not overwrought feeling project the past into the future? The potential opt. with *ἄν* (*κεν*), on the other hand, is not to be explained away. Homer and the Ionians use it of the past. The solitary passage in Attic Ar., R. 413-14 Stahl does not explain as I do, S. C. G. 439, in point of fact does not explain it at all. He is quite right about Th. I, 9, 4: *οὐκ ἂν πολλὰ εἶεν* and so are others. S. C. G., p. 174 footnote.

In synthetic subordinate clauses and dependent principal clauses the time of the moods is relative and we have to do with contemporaneity, priority, superiority. In most of them the action is necessarily posterior as in final sentences and sentences with *ἕως* and *πρίν*, which Stahl calls, as I do, 'temporal sentences of limit'. In others the choice of the kind of time is influenced by relative past and relative present; so that we may say, though Stahl does not say so, that the moods simulate the indicative. All this, apart from the intolerable verbiage, is common property. There are a few final sentences in which the aor. subj. seems to refer to the present and Stahl cites Eur., Hipp. 1299: *ὥς ἵπ' εὐκλείας θάγη* and explains by 'Verschiebung der Modalität'. The real object lies in the modifier, and Stahl interprets *ἵνα θανῶν εὐκλείαν ἔχη*. The aorist as the shorthand of the periphrastic perfect gives a simpler statement and a readier classification. Then follows a list of examples of necessarily posterior 'phenomena', the pres. subj. being used when the 'phenomenon' is contemporaneous and when the 'phenomenon' is prior but durative—no provision being made for overlapping—the aorist subj. being used when the 'phenomenon' is prior *an sich*; and attention is directed again to what I should call the mechanical exactness of Attic ISS.—according to Meistershans, a point which deserves reëxamination. Coincidence of aor. with future—a conspicuous feature—is passed over lightly. The same rules apply to generic sentences. In posterior temporal sentences (temporal sentences of limit) the present subj. denotes that the 'phenomenon' is coming to pass, the aorist that it has come to pass. For all this, I would refer the curious reader, if such an one there be, to A. J. P. XXIV 388 foll. on the Temporal



Sentences of Limit. Again, but not for the last time, Stahl insists on the wide reach of 'freie Anschauung' and yet seems to be gruelled by the narrowing of the scope in the case of  $\pi\rho\acute{\iota}\nu$ , which has a marked repugnance to the pres. subj. 'Wenn nicht ausdrücklich etwas Zuständliches bezeichnet wird ist die nachfolgende Erscheinung als eingetreten denkbar. Daher überwiegt hier bei weitem der Aorist'. Why this dreadful roundabout? The action in  $\sigma\upsilon-\pi\rho\acute{\iota}\nu$  is prior to the action of the leading clause, and unless there is overlapping the aorist is to be expected (A. J. P. II 481). The one exception in Stahl's beloved Thukydides 6, 38, 2 is solved by the principle of overlapping. 'We are slow to put ourselves on our guard = we do not put ourselves on our guard until we find ourselves, etc'.  $\kappa\alpha\kappa\omicron\iota$  is clearly equivalent to a negative.

There is a *salto mortale* from the other uses of the optative to that of the optative for the indicative in *oratio obliqua*. The Germanic use has given no end of trouble. Even renunciation of responsibility does not meet all the conditions and to call the mood a sign of obliquity is a mere evasion. The only example that Stahl can cite from Homer is in an interrogative sentence (cf. S. C. G. 307), and he gives no explanation of the exclusion of the optative from other classes of sentences in Homer. Now this Homeric limitation of the optative may be explained either as suppression or as checked extension. I have had something to say in favor of checked extension (A. J. P. XXVII 205). Stahl is utterly non-committal. The familiar use of the infinitive in *oratio obliqua*, natural as it seems to us, is an extension. In fact, the use of *oratio obliqua*, at all, has been set down as more or less artificial; as, f. i., by Wilamowitz on the recently discovered fragments of Korinna (p. 54), though in English, if we consult our consciousness, there seems to be little difficulty about the shift. In Greek the 'Modusverschiebung' of the opt. for the subj. is an explicable thing, but optative for indic. came or seems to have come only through the interrogative sentence, in which the shift of subj. to opt. spreads to the indicative, by progressive analogy, as no one dares to say false analogy.

Under the infinitive we have the inevitable wearisome iteration of 'Zeitart' and 'Zeitstufe'. Of course he recognizes the fact that after  $\omega\sigma\tau\epsilon$  the fut. inf. must represent the fut. indic. in *oratio obliqua*, on which see A. J. P. VII 174. Consequently he reads Pindar, N. 5, 36:  $\pi\rho\acute{\alpha}\sigma\sigma\epsilon\upsilon\nu$  for  $\pi\rho\acute{\alpha}\xi\epsilon\upsilon\nu$ . To be sure,  $\omega\sigma\tau\epsilon$  is not

fully developed in Pindar (I. E. cviii), and an *oratio obliqua* twist is suggested by the passage, but it must be confessed that ὥστ' ἐν τάχει . . . . πράσσειν is seductive. Compare S. C. G. 206 and 405 on the use of durative tenses with adverbs and adverbial phrases denoting rapidity. Of the practical limitation of πρίν to the aor. inf. in the early times Stahl gives the following so-called explanation :

Da es in denjenigen Fällen, wo das relativ Zukünftige nicht an sich von längerer Dauer ist, der freien Auffassung anheimfällt, ob man es als eintretend oder eingetreten vorstellen will, so erklärt es sich, dass in Sätzen dieser Art der Inf. Aor. bei weitem überwiegt und bei Homer und Hesiod der Inf. Praes. nur an der einen oben angeführten Stelle (Il. XVIII 245)<sup>1</sup> vorkommt.

The formula I have used for forty years and published more than thirty years ago puts the thing in a nutshell. πρίν is a negative. It is = οὔπω or μῆπω. Its natural affinities are with the aorist, πρίν ἐλθεῖν νῆας Ἀχαιῶν = οὔπω ἐλθόντων Ἀχαιῶν (A. J. P. II 467). The πρίν of the grammars was once a hopeless mess and I venture to say that the first orderly exhibit of its use is to be found in the seventh edition of Liddell and Scott, whence it was promptly conveyed by Mr. Thompson without acknowledgment in his Syntax of Attic Greek published soon afterwards. τὰμὰ δ' ἐμά.

The articular infinitive is treated with Stahl's wonted tortuousness and prolixity—the tortuousness inexcusable, the prolixity perhaps justifiable in view of the confusion regnant in Madvig and Goodwin. I will simply state the matter in my own words and pass on. The articular infinitive as an abstract noun has only the kind of time, as an incorporation of the indicative it has all the tenses, future inclusive.

The infinitive after *verba volendi, valendi* and *faciendi*, which I call verbs of creation, is necessarily posterior to the leading verb and we have only the kind of time. But Stahl makes an exceptional class in which the notion of wish intrudes and he maintains that in these cases the aor. inf. can stand as the aor. opt. stands instead of the unreal. Every teacher knows that the translation of 'I wish I had seen' is a regular pitfall for the schoolboy, who tumbles into it with his βούλομαι ἰδεῖν. It is a pity that Stahl should have lent the sanction of his name to such a statement. In all the cogent passages that he cites, the unreality is transferred to the leading verb as in ἐβουλόμην ἄν.

<sup>1</sup> See A. J. P. II 467.

The infinitive representing the indicative and the indicative with *ἄν* calls for no comment. Interesting is the observation that impersonal expressions which convey the sense of a verb of saying or thinking, such as, ἀληθές, πιθανόν, ἄπιστον, occur very rarely, if at all. Either a personal turn is given or the articular infinitive is used. The transition of verbs of thinking into verbs of willing with the retention of the future construction is fully illustrated and with these verbs he classes μέλλω, in spite of its uncertain etymology. Of course, the Homeric 'likelihood' sense of μέλλω is noticed, but he does not go so far as those English scholars who acknowledge no other Homeric sense than that of 'likelihood' (Platt, E. J., Phil. XXI 40, Leaf on K 454) except with the future infinitive. This rule, accepted by so cautious a scholar as the late Mr. Monro (Od. 14, 133), requires, as so many rules require, changes in our traditional text. Stahl takes no notice of it whatever, but does not fail to call attention to the fact that the postponement μέλλω is not to be found in Homer nor in Hesiod either. The native hue of resolution has not been sicklied o'er by this pale cast of thought until it becomes 'delay'. The tendency is to use the future inf. of a more remote, the present of an immediate future (*in eo esse ut*), but there is the warning of the 'freie Auffassung'. Compare S. C. G. 272, and my review of Abbott's Johannine Grammar (A. J. P. XXVII 334). εἰκός, 'it is meet', passes over into εἰκός, 'it is probable', but its original force holds it to the construction of verbs of will. Herodotos uses the fut. inf. once (8, 68) and Xenophon sins, of course, and Isaios keeps him company once. But this conservatism of εἰκός is not a little remarkable, and may have a certain significance in connexion with the swing of τὰ εἰκότα in forensic oratory. Verbs of saying and thinking shift. ἐλπίζω as in English 'hope', προσδοκᾶν as in English 'expect', may be used of future ascertainment and the pres. inf. is in place. ὑπισχεῖσθαι is not only 'promise' of the future but 'maintain' of the present and as a verb of will, it does not require the future infinitive. δμύναι is another such verb. εὐχεσθαι is both 'praedicare' and 'precari'. Compare English 'vow'. All this is or ought to be familiar to the student of Greek, but it is true that ordinarily too little attention is paid to these shifts and Stahl embraces the opportunity to get in some critical remarks. When φάναι involves the will, it does not demand the future tense and the same thing is true of δοκεῖν, about which there has been a great deal of un-

necessary pother and so other verbs of believing and thinking, better believing than thinking, as believing is clearly voluntative. It is through this door, as I have maintained (A. J. P. XXVII 203) that *oratio obliqua* came in and the future infinitive is merely an accommodation, a view with which, I fancy, Stahl would have little sympathy. ἀναβάλλεσθαι, 'to postpone', with the fut. inf. Stahl questions and would substitute present or aorist where the future is found. But analogy is a subtle thing and the wholesale changing of -σαι into -σειν and *vice versa* at the bidding of grammatical 'rule' can hardly be deemed satisfactory. Verbal nouns like ἐλπίς may take the fut. inf. *qua* verb, the other infinitives *qua* noun; the latter with a preponderance of examples, matching preponderance of occurrences, by no means the same thing, for like the rest of us Stahl has his prejudices. Next Stahl makes war on the few passages in which verbs of will are combined with the future, for some of which Goodwin stands up stoutly. διανοεῖσθαι Stahl had already accepted as a verb of thinking—the only example of the shift I have given (S. C. G. 326). The others are remorselessly rooted up by a process in which he had been preceded by the uniformitarians. Much more common are the instances in which the present and aorist infinitive are used as future after verbs of saying. Many of these passages have been emended in our texts. -σαι has been replaced by -σειν, -σασθαι by -σεσθαι, -εσθαι by -σεσθαι, and ἄν has served as a ready handmaid to put the sentence into grammatical order. With most of these changes I am in sympathy and MS variants bear them out, but much depends on the period, the sphere and the author and wherever will intrudes we desiderate the ingressive aorist. But Stahl, who is nearly as old as I am, does not care for the ingressive aorist, and alters P. 4, 222: μείξαι into μείξειν against his own principles. See my note on the passage, 'A promise as a vow takes the aorist of the future', and compare P. 1, 44.

The present of the 'independent participle'<sup>1</sup> denotes contemporaneity or prior duration—'overlapping' is not distinctly mentioned, the perfect denotes completed condition whether contemporaneous or prior, the aorist denotes *per se* priority, the future posteriority as also the part. + ἄν = opt. with ἄν. Outside the

<sup>1</sup> 'Independent participle' is a contradiction in terms. One might as well speak of an independent skin. Stahl uses 'independent' in contrast to the participle that represents a finite verb (S. C. G. 354).

combination with verbs of motion and with the post-Homeric *ὥς* the future participle is very sparingly represented, as Od. 11, 608: αἰεὶ βαλέοῃσι τοῖσι where, it might be remarked, the future participle is used in the full and original μέλλω sense and 17, 387: τρύχοντα εἰ αὐτὸν where one is sorely tempted to read τρύχοντα. Thuk. 6, 78, 4: ὁμόρους ὄντας καὶ τὰ δεύτερα κινδυνεύουσας = μέλλοντας κινδυνεύουσιν, the present participle carries with it the future, as elsewhere in Thukydides. The same temporal uses are found in the absolute participle and in the articular participle, are found and exemplified.

Then follows a chapter on the coincident aor. participle with aor. See S. C. G. 345. A few examples of the aor. partic. after verbs of hearing are given. It is a rare construction. Hearing and speaking do not coincide, in spite of Stahl. A causal nexus is possible. Coincident action with the future is represented by a few examples. Under this general head Stahl puts the participle with φθάνω, λανθάνω, τυγχάνω, but does not notice the steadiness of φθάνω, and the fickleness of τυγχάνω, as he might have done, if he had thought it worth while to read my article in A. J. P. XII 76. Yet another class is made up of aorist participles which follow the leading verb and being logically coördinate are absolutely and not relatively past; e. g., Od. 4, 56: σίτον δ' αἰδοίῃ ταμὴν παρέθηκε φέρονσα | εἶδατα πόλλ' ἐπιθείσα. Stahl does not say so in so many words but he implies that the action of the aor. part. is subsequent to the action of the leading verb. The translation by καί = καὶ εἶδατα πόλλ' ἐπέθηκε is not satisfactory. Coincidence or adverbiality will explain the tense. Pindar, O. 7. 5: εἴ τις δωρήσεται = δωρήσεται . . . τιμάσαις, the participle is not = καὶ τιμάσῃ. The δῶρον is the τιμή. See my note on the passage and also on P. 4, 130, where the aorist is due to the definite number. The example from the Gortyn IS. III 17: αἱ ἀνὴρ ἀποθάνοι τέκνα καταλιπών like the English 'died leaving' is a clear case of coincidence. Actual posteriority Stahl recognizes in participles that follow verbs of waiting; as, Il. 13, 37: ἀμφὶ δὲ ποσσὶ πέδας βάλε . . . ὅφρ' ἐμπεδον αἰθεὶ μένοιεν νοστήσαντα ἄνακτα = εἰς ὃ κ' ἄναξ νοστήσειε (cf. II, 666). And this is his explanation of the very common construction of περιορᾶν with the aor. part. περιδεῖν he considers = 'abwarten'. But περιδεῖν cannot be divorced from ἐπιδεῖν and the notion of will intrudes (A. J. P. XIV 103). The 'dependent' participle—the participle that represents the indicative—yields nothing novel and I am glad, and, doubtless, the reader, if I should

chance to capture one, will be glad, to have reached the end of a summary, which presents so little that is, at once, new and acceptable. The value of the material abides, and Stahl has earned the praise of primacy as a *condus*, *promus*, *procurator peni* of the Syntax of the Greek Verb. The troublesome problems of the Moods must be reserved for another number, if I find it in my heart to continue the analysis and the commentary.

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